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Winners or losers? 
State measures in crisis management and the energy markets 
  Sarolta Somosi 
Several studies have been made about the present global financial crisis that has affected real 
economy as well. We know the root causes and its consequences. However we found a sector 
that has not been examined comprehensively in inland studies on the ground of changing 
environment. It is worth examining the effects on energy sector on the basis of their stages and 
impacts. Among governmental responses we can find several that hit energy markets, like super-
taxes, privatisation or the broadening of state ownership. National supports were introduced for 
the handling of the financial crisis within the energy sector. However we must add that energy 
market supports served rather development purposes and not company salvage like we have 
seen it in other sectors. Also competition rules remained almost as consistent as we experienced 
it before. Moreover, if recent EU level energy policy projects come true, energy sector can even 
realize profit from the crisis. Future of the European energy markets depends on the recognition 
and exploitation of the possibilities coming from new circumstances. 
Keywords: energy markets, economic crisis, state measures 
1. Introduction 
Present economic crisis has different effects on each sector owing to their original condition and their 
nature. Thanks to its characteristics energy is a special segment of all economies and so it is worth 
reviewing whether crisis has any special outcome or does the sector have any role in crisis 
management that is worth mentioning.  
Several studies have analyzed the effects of the crisis on some parts of energy markets, but no 
comprehensive study can be found about the interaction between state crisis management measures 
and energy markets, more precisely power and gas markets. Because of the high level of interlocking 
on European energy markets, we examine the situation from an EU perspective and line up examples 
from several member states that explain, support or rather contradict mainstream processes. 
First of all we show the effects of the crisis on energy prices, demand and investments. Then we 
analyze the relationship between state crisis management and energetics, examine not only the 
supports and allowances but also discovering a kind of donor rule of energetics in recent state actions. 
Finally we illuminate those possibilities which have appeared thanks to the new circumstances. In our 
opinion this is important because the EU- and state-level responses given to the crisis will determine 
the future path of community energy policy.  
Our research is an assimilation – beside relevant EU and OECD documents – of domestic and 
international studies, but in order to be up-to-date information from the daily press had been applied as 
well. 
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2. The effects of crisis on energy markets 
Recent years of European energetic history contained many exciting turns and episodes. The huge oil-
price increase of 2008 and the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of the subsequent winter were events 
with probably unprecedented effects on general European energetics. However according to the 
Commission the global financial and economic crisis proved to be the biggest challenge that has long-
term effects on Member States’ energy markets (European Commission, 2009). 
2.1. Energy consumption and determination of energy prices 
Energy consumption stabilized by the end of 2007 has fallen in the next two years due to the crisis. 
Changes in energy demand are affected by several factors, among them by the energy-using sub-
sectors. On Figure 1 below it is shown how these sectors – using energy as input for their activities – 
shared energy consumption in the European Union and in Hungary before the crisis. 
Figure 1: Energy consumption by sectors (%) (2007) 
 
Source: Own edition based on European Commission (2010a) 
Households, transport and industry are the three biggest groups of consumers. Among energy-
intensive sectors the processing (car manufacturing and machinery) and building industries suffered 
from the biggest losses owing to recent years’ events. The decrease of energy consumption is less 
imputable to households and the transport sector. Compared to other products’ and services’ energy 
needs, demand seems to be less flexible thanks to the importance and high proportion of the later 
mentioned sectors. Accordingly energetics are said to be ‘crisis-proof’: energy consumption has fallen 
less compared to the processing industry (Figure 2). 
We must add that despite the crisis recent years’ energy consumption exceeded the level of the early 
1990s. In EU Member States it has touched bottom level in 1994 with its 1053.152 million tones 
(which is 94 percent of the amount of 2009). In the meantime in Hungary the worst year from this 
perspective was 1997 with its 15.952 million tones which is 97 percent of the 2009 data).1 
By the decrease of demand oversupply had an effect on energy prices as well. By the summer of 2008 
the oil price (per barrel) reached an extraordinary level of 140 USD, but with the economic turmoil it 
fall to 43 USD in the first half of 2009 and stabilized around 70 USD in the summer of 2009. This 
brought a decrease in wholesale gas and electricity prices as well. Figure 3 shows the above mentioned 
                                                     
1
 From this point of view the recent economic crisis could be considered to outweigh previous recessions. If we 
count the growing tendency of energy consumption the higher amount of 2009 can only be attributed to the 
increasing energy intensity of the last two decades in each sector. 
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peak in 2009 and decrease in 2010. The reason of delayed representation is the oil price based gas 
price determination. 
Figure 2: The set of different economic data of the EU and Hungary between 2005 and 2009 
(previous year=100%) 
 
Source: Own edition based on the data of Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
Figure 3: Fluctuation of natural gas prices for industrial and household consumers in the EU 
and Hungary (EUR/GJ) 
 
Source: Own edition based on the data of Eurostat 
The change is not so prominent but nevertheless appears on electricity market as well. According to 
the data of Eurostat price maximum could be measured by European and Hungarian industry users and 
EU-27 households in the first half of 2009. Hungarian households experienced the price increase a 
little bit later (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Fluctuation of electricity prices for industrial and household consumers in the EU and 
Hungary (EUR/kWh) 
 
Source: Own edition based on the data of Eurostat 
2.2. The effect of the crisis on energetic investments 
In long term the most unfavourable turn of economic turmoil is the line of delayed or cancelled 
investments. From this point the most important question is that for how long will the crisis be drawn 
out. The longer the energy demand decreasing and price depressing crisis runs, the more uncertain will 
the return of investments be. The London based World Economic Council has made a research already 
in autumn 2008 with the participation of 65 energetic companies from 16 European countries. At that 
time investment willingness appeared to be optimistic, since companies thought that 20 percentages of 
investments could be fulfilled in time, 40 percentages would be postponed for 2 years and only 20 
percentages of them would be delayed for uncertain deadline.  
According to the 2009 report of OECD strong and financially stabile companies have maintained their 
plans but others announced to supervise their investment strategies within and outside the EU as well. 
Energy market players have reduced such spending with about one fifth (around 100 billion US 
dollars) (OECD-IEA, 2009). Development of renewable energy resources has fallen a lot more, with 
about 38 percentages. Similarly to OECD countries, the efforts of re-structuring the European Union’s 
energy markets halted, nevertheless clean energy investments exceeded other areas’ investments both 
in 2008 and in 2009 (New Energy Finance, 2009).  
The paralyzed credit market, higher capital costs and risk avoiding, altogether the difficulties of 
receiving credit are the reason for lower investment willingness. Falling demand and prices, the 
uncertain starting point of recovery make energy investments less attractive among service providers 
as well (Houssin, 2009). The development of new technologies have been set back because none of the 
states were forced to pay attention to the improvement of energy efficiency. This will cause serious 
problems by the end of the turmoil, when energy demand will rise again and the investments – that 
should have provided the replacement of running out resources – had been cancelled or at least 
reduced (Connor, 2009). 
Analyses of the consequences of the economic crisis confirms that energetics are among the crisis-
proof sectors notwithstanding that consumption and prices have fallen. Natural gas and electricity 
demand is relatively inflexible irrespective of the fact that the circumstances have changed. Indirectly, 
through the recession of financial and processing sectors and services economic crisis affects 
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energetics. This appears mostly in slight reduction of demand, in the cut of credit financing energy 
investments and in the permanent subsistence of economic uncertainty. 
3. The relationship of state crisis management and energy markets 
Economies are hit severely by real economic crisis in three areas. The amount of credits and market 
possibilities has decreased and numerous employment possibilities ceased. Hence we introduce those 
crisis managing measures that are somehow in connection with energy markets. 
3.1. State crisis management by the help of energy sectors 
Measures shall be sorted by the period of their effects in order to differentiate the emergency steps 
from those having permanent result. Most energetic companies – because of their management and 
ownership structure – are suitable to provide short term income for governments in the way of paying 
super-taxes or by the clearance sale of company assets.  
According to its effects, the introduction and transaction period of super-tax assessment on well 
prospering sectors, like banking, telecommunication, energetics and retail trade is the fastest 
measure/tool. It is neither unknown in inland practice. 
In connection with the 2006 economic stabilization Hungarian government has assessed extra 
burden on banks and pharmaceutical companies among others. The purpose of the so called 
Robin Hood-tax applied to energetic companies with profit over 8 percentages was to decrease 
the fee of distance heating. In 2010 the government has extended both the group of stricken 
sectors and the rate of the tax. New burden was introduced in the energetics and the income was 
generally provided for the correction of the budgetary deficit (Voszka, 2011). 
Similar efforts have been made in Slovakia, where the Fico administration called upon foreign owned 
companies to decrease energy prices. Their aim was to support public expenditures of social groups 
with low income level from their profit – like in the case of Robin Hood-tax (Szilvássy, 2006).  
Super-taxes and other profit decreasing regulations can have a pressing down effect on relevant 
company assets. That is why these tools are unfavorable in case of energy company privatization, the 
other emergency problem-solving method. In turn some European countries chose this way of budget 
balancing. Greece, being maybe in the worst position, has also announced to put together a 
privatization package of 50 billion euro. 
According to the CEO of the company the biggest challenge will be the sale of 17 percentages of 
PPC, the energy company with already 51 percentages of state majority. Although Greek crisis 
decreases stock rates it is not sure that serious interest will appear. Its appeal/seduction 
diminishes since the administration is willing to keep management rights, and energy demand is 
decreasing because liberalization process in the European perspective is lagging behind 
(Galambos P., 2011b). 
The Greek example is not standing alone. Poland has also announced to privatize 16 percentages of 
Enea energy company in order to lessen the country’s debt. Swedish prime minister has mentioned the 
electricity interested Vattenfall group among those who may realize profit from the appearance of a 
new minority owner (Adósságkezelő privatizáció, 2010). The possibility of getting income this way is 
a narrow path, since the majority of EU member states do not dispose over significant ownership in 
natural gas and electricity sectors. Among the exceptions we can find Ireland, Poland, Greece, 
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Slovakia, France, Denmark and Austria in 2008. Sweden and the Czech Republic had significant state 
majority only in the electricity sector (Wölfl et al., 2009; Haney and Pollitt, 2010).  
In turn a converse tool could be applied for handling budgetary or debt problems where energy 
privatization took place earlier. This is the set back of a significant level of state ownership in stabile, 
long term dividend income providing companies. This measure belongs to those that have permanent 
results in longer term. 
We can find examples for these measures again in Slovakia, which appeared to be the most 
active in this field. Seven years after its sale, it has bought back the 49 percentages of 
Transpetrol for triple costs in 2009.2 The administration has announced further deals alluding 
strategic companies (Ficoék…, 2009). The water power plant of Gabčikovo, which is now hired 
by Slovenské Elektrárne (The Slovakian Electricity Company) from the Italian Enel group is 
among these possible transactions. This re-secularization is helped by the adoption of an act in 
2009 about strategic companies. According to the act, the state can practise ownership rights 
over companies that are in serious economic turmoil because of the crisis until it may find 
proper buyer, who declares to run it in long term (Mentőövbe…, 2009). 
The extension of state ownership is an important aim of the Hungarian administration that has entered 
into office in 2010. This appears in the energy sector, although super-taxes, demand decrease and other 
regulation did not have a stock rate decreasing effect. 
The biggest case was the purchase of 21 percentages block of shares of MOL Hungarian Oil 
Company with a regional leading role in 2011. The remains of the IMF credit covered the 
transaction. Moreover the administration has subordinated the tasks of South Stream gas 
transmission pipeline under the supervision of the state-owned power producer, Magyar 
Villamos Művek Zrt. (MVM) and the re-purchase of the whole gas-business from E.On also 
became an issue (Az MVM-é…, 2011). The expected dividend income may have an important 
share in the decision to prefer the wholly state-owned MVM compared to MOL, which is only 
partially under parliamentary control. 
We can see similar processes also outside the European Union. The Croatian government has made 
several efforts towards the recuperation of majority shares of INA oil company. These facts are 
insistent because the other actor of the deal is the previously mentioned Hungarian energetic company.  
Two dominant shareholders of INA are the MOL with its 47.2 and the Croatian government with 
its 44.8 percentage of shares (Mindenkinek…, 2011). After the 2008 privatization they have 
made an agreement about the help in crisis management in favour of management rights 
received by the MOL (Galambos M., 2011). Croatian administration deployed several capital 
market and regulative measures to obtain the majority or to cut the management rights in the 
hands of MOL (Diszkriminatívnak…, 2011). Until now these efforts failed but recently penal 
procedures have been initiated which may be motivated by internal affairs in connection with 
the recent Croatian elections (Galambos P., 2011a). 
The financial effect of extending state ownership is quite uncertain. Recent volatility of stock rates, the 
non-aligned governmental actions can easily bring the devaluation of block of shares, as we can 
already see it in the case of MOL. In this case the return of the investment from dividend income can 
shift for longer period. 
                                                     
2
 The company runs the Slovakian part of Friendship oil transport pipeline, through which the MOL owned 
Slovnaft refinery receives oil. 
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3.2. Handling the crisis of energy sectors 
Temporary allowances of competition regulation – the control of mergers and acquisitions, antitrust 
measures and actions against cartels – belong to crisis management tools. Beside extended state aid 
possibilities, more flexible evaluation of fusions, dominant position and the permission of crisis-cartels 
can help to avoid the deepening of recession. The European Union has made such efforts, but finally 
the legal background remained and only the procedures became more flexible. In case of energetics we 
focus to the evaluation of fusions. 
3.2.1 Consideration of energetic fusions 
The judgement of a fusion should always be subject of detailed consideration because higher 
concentration, beside its efficiency benefits, usually means lower level of competition. In case of 
economic crisis it is of high importance whether supporting companies in economic difficulties or 
permitting a fusion holds lower risks. Namely latter may distort market structure while government 
support is only a temporary action (Laki and Voszka, 2010). 
With the economic turmoil the number of fusions announced to the Commission decreased. In 2007 
there were 402, in 2008 347 and in 2009 only 259 cases were recorded by the Competition DG. An 
upswing came in 2010 with its 274 cases and it seems to continue in 2011 according to the mid-term 
228 announcement.3 The temporary decline in the number of fusions is explained with the fact that 
during economic crisis company saving fusions are more general within national borders, so they do 
not reach Community market (Reynolds et al., 2011).  
The number of EU-level energetic company fusions reflects the opposite tendency. The peak of 2001-
2003 was followed by a lower merger activity, apart from fusions in 2006. Mergers multiplied from 
2007, they reached the highest level of the decade in 2009 and only started to decline in 2010. 
Figure 5: The range of energetic fusions announced to the European Commission between 1994 
and 2011 
 
Source: Own edition based on the data of European Commission Competition DG 
The numbers shown in Figure 5 reflect the fact that energetic companies did not get into serious crisis, 
the economic turmoil has boosted/accelerated the already started consolidation process on the EU 
energy market. (Moreover these data do not contain the national transactions which are said to be a 
general characteristic of this special sector.4) In this economic turmoil the number of fusions both in 
national markets and with EU relevancy increased. If we examine the decisions, the Commission had 
                                                     
3
 Data are from Competitive Merger Case Statistics from the official homepage of the Commission. 
4
 Often smaller energetic companies get sold, so there is no need for Community approval. An example for such 
case is the acquisition of Envacom by Gazprom, with which the German authority has approved the Russian 
player to be set on German electricity market (Kis lépés ez…, 2011). 
Crisis Aftermath: Economic policy changes in the EU and its Member States  
 
488 
investigated 110 cases during the crisis (from the summer of 2008 until autumn 2011) and all of them 
were permitted. This fits the trend, since only 3 of the altogether 2956 mergers from all sectors of 
European economies were not allowed to be created.5 Thus in our opinion there is no evidence for the 
temporary allowances made within competition regulation.  
Analyzing the range of fusions permitted with commitments in the period from 2008 compared to the 
previous period might be even more meaningful. There were only 5 cases in energetics from 2002 
until September 2008.6 Since the crisis commenced there were no case in which phase II. proceeding 
was initiated. At the same time commitments were made in phase I proceedings 5 times. The first 
decision was made in case of a merger between a French and a British energy provider 
(COMP/M.5224 – EdF/British Energy). 
EdF has announced its intent to buy British Energy in 2008. With this transaction two 
significant players of the British electricity market could join, but their aggregated market share 
is still less than 30 percentages. In order to get the permission in phase I procedure of the 
decision, relevant companies undertook to sell two power plants, and to launch an amount of 
electricity into the wholesale market. Furthermore, EdF has committed itself to making sites 
suited for nuclear new build available to competitors (Drauz et al., 2010). 
Similarly the Commission has imposed commitments in cases of EdF/Segebel (COMP/M.5549), Nuon 
Energy/Vattenfall (COMP/M.5496) and in the acquisition of Essent by RWE (COMP/M.5467). With 
the 5th decision made in January 2011, Gaz de France could obtain interests in international power 
market by the help of a merger with International Power Plc. (COMP/M.5978). According to the 
commitments the latter had to sell its power market interest and divest relationship with RWE in order 
to maintain the level of competition in the Belgian market.  
The growing number of mergers and acquisitions does not mean that the importance and value of the 
cases are also increasing. The size of the firms, the uncertain economic circumstances, the decrease of 
demand and the measures of crisis management that bring the ease of listing rates are all responsible 
for that.7 Even though the number of energetic fusions has increased on relevant markets of the EU, 
we could not find serious change in the proceedings of the authorization compared to the experience of 
the previous decade. This may be traced back to the quantitatively more but in significance smaller 
cases. It is difficult to answer whether the number of M&A has increased because of the current 
economic background or owing to the consolidation resulting from more than 10 years of 
liberalization process. In the justification and evaluation we can rarely find the crisis, after all new 
circumstances brought new guidelines in consolidation. Profitability and secure capital background 
became even more important. Meanwhile the pressure from the market and regulators are much more 
intensive towards development of infrastructure and energy efficiency. So it seems to be a good 
strategy also in Europe to find a partner with stabile financial background to be able to invest, as it is 
written by Feibelman (2011) in connection with the American market. 
                                                     
5
 In the previous 13 years, between 1990 and 2002 18 mergers/acquisitions did not receive Community approval. 
6
 The legal background of the judgements was articles 8(2) and 6(2) of the former Regulation No. 4064/89 and 
the current Regulation No. 139/2004 about merger control. 
7
 According to Ross (2011) similar happens on US energy markets. Even the number of fusions did not change 
(it was 37 in 2010 and 36 until November 2011), the value that they represent has declined. Worries coming 
from the volatile stock prices and from public debt have important share in this. 
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3.2.2 State aid in energy sectors 
With the outbreak of the crisis state aids referred significantly to the corrections of financial market 
and for bank savings. Banks have resorted 1600 billions of Euros (the 13 percentages of GDP of the 
EU) in the period between October 2008 and the end of 2010 (European Commission, 2011c).8 
Commission has stressed that bank supporting is important because of its special function and must 
not be considered as a precedent for other sectors of the economy (Kroes, 2009). Nevertheless, 
supports and state aids have spread in real economy as well, but in much lower extent thanks to the 
mediate prosperous effect of bank supports. Fields beside the financial sector received altogether 81 
billions of Euros, but only 26 percentages (0.2 percentages of EU GDP) have been used to recovery 
until the end of 2010 (European Commission, 2011d). This belongs to the second wave of crisis 
management tools, among the stimulant measures. These measures are generally based on Keynes’ 
theory which means demand side economic policy with budgetary expansion but may vary from each 
other (Dessewffy, 2009).9 
The mediate effect of supporting the financial and real economy sectors had improved the conditions 
of energetics as well. Even though it was not the energetic sector that has been damaged seriously in 
recent years, its strategic characteristic and its long term potential make it impossible to leave it alone 
neither on EU-level nor on national level. We have found some examples for economic stimulation. 
The Commission has approved several state aid in energetics between 2009 and 2011. Such 
action was to support the construction of CO2 capture, transport and storage facilities in the 
Rotterdam area, The Netherlands (N381/2010), the support for the construction of a district 
heating network in the Northeast of Paris, France (N630/2009) or the construction of 
interconnection and cross-border power line between Poland and Lithuania (N542/2010) 
(Feldner and Thalhammer, 2011). Another example could be the €16 million Austrian support 
approved by the Commission to an environment-friendly project by Verbund-Austrian Thermal 
Power (N295/2008). 
The above mentioned cases are all development supports, which affirms that serious company-saving 
actions or capitalizations were redundant in the energetics because of its defensive characteristic.  
Tax-allowances also stimulate energy management. Great amount of this is the reduction of taxes on 
CO2 emissions or the exemption from energy based taxes. An example for the latter mentioned is the 
tax rate reduction for the glasshouse horticulture sector in the Netherlands (N270/2010). Unfortunately 
such reductions and allowances prefer also energy-intensive or polluting industries (Commission of…, 
2009). Such happened in the SA.32875 case when lower rate for supplies of natural gas in Northern 
Ireland (to industrial and services sectors and agriculture) was approved. 
Using fixed energy prices is also a tool serving the reserve of energy demand. In 2008 Slovakia and in 
2010 Hungary applied this measure temporarily, but in 2011 electricity prices rose again in Hungary.  
Among general economic stimulant measures we can find more and more examples that serve energy 
efficiency or support the usage of green/clear energy. Belgium, Finland, France, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Slovakia and the United Kingdom have launched programs in order to help the economic 
                                                     
8
 Bank guarantees mean further 1.2 billion of EUR (9.8 percentages of EU total GDP) (European Commission, 
2011b). 
9
 We can find government orders, public infrastructure developments, the support of private investments or the 
increase of household consumption through decreased taxes or increased social expenditure (Laki and Voszka, 
2010). 
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recovery through energy industry as well (OECD, 2009). In 2009 13.2 billions of Euros were spent 
through state aid for such projects within the European Union (European Commission, 2011a). These 
steps bring us towards the long term efforts of crisis management. 
4. Proceeds and possibilities on energy markets resulting from the crisis 
During economic fire-fighting we have to take into consideration that power and sustainability of 
growing in European economies can be ensured only by energy system re-structuring, which means 
improved energy safety and lower emission of greenhouse gases. That is why in 2009 the European 
Union has decided to establish a programme to aid economic recovery by granting Community 
financial assistance to projects in the field of energy (European Parliament…, 2009). The dedicated 
financial facility (fund) connected to this program has special importance, because crisis has 
extinguished large amount of energetic investments.10 This fund can help increasing the investments in 
order to reach the above mentioned goals. 
Since the project is a Community initiative, it does not belong to the category of traditional state aid 
formally. The European Commission has chosen three fields – gas and electricity infrastructure, 
offshore wind energy, carbon capture and storage – that are capable of making efficient and effective 
use of significant amounts of financial assistance and catalyzing extra investment from other sources, 
like the European Investment Bank.11 This may have positive effects not only on related sectors and 
companies but on the whole economy thanks to its spill-over effects. 
The budget of the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) in 2009 and 2010 could allocate 
almost EUR 4 billion financing the three chosen fields (European Commission, 2010b). The 
evaluation report of 2011 is prosperous: “The programme provided a unique opportunity to boost 
strategic EU investment projects, particularly during a period when pure commercial considerations, 
combined with the economic and financial crisis, were limiting new investment.” (European 
Commission, 2011e, p. 5). Financial sources may be increased from further state investments, as the 
Energy Commissioner has highlighted it. According to him state participation in energetic investments 
of inter-connections is worth considering, since public sector in average gives 16 percentages of all 
energy consumption within the EU (Rosemberg, 2010). 
4.1. Will there be a green outcome from the crisis? 
One benefit of the decreasing electricity and gas demand of recent years is that there is a markable 
decrease in the emission of greenhouse gases and carbon-dioxide. It may happen that this effect will be 
seen only in short term and only because of the recession (OECD, 2009). The running of energy 
efficiency and saving projects can be questioned because of the low oil prices and so the return 
possibilities of green energy investments.12 Owing to the short term crisis management preferences can 
change and state incomes can lower and may distract resources from energy efficiency and climate 
change programs. Investment re-scheduling and supervising are not answers belonging only to 
governments, but in recent years the measures of companies, citizens and local authorities have also 
                                                     
10
 Regulation (EC) No 663/2009 
11
 The annex of the regulation contains those projects that are considered to be worth of supports by the 
Commission. Such project is the establishment of Southern Gas corridor, the Baltic interconnection and further 9 
programs of Central and South-Eastern Europe, out of which Hungary is involved in 5 projects. 
12
 If the renewables could compete only with governmental support at an oil price of 140 USD/barrel, then a 
permanent price of 80-100 USD/barrel is even worse from the aspect of future return. 
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decreased. All the today cancelled green or efficiency based energy investments will cause higher 
emission in longer term. 
EU-level and state commitment towards green energy seems to be strong despite of the recession 
(Robins et al., 2009). Crisis gave new impetus to create and put a new and – from the perspective of 
energy and pollution – cleaner production structure into the focus of economy stimulating programs. 
From state crisis management packages of autumn 2008 almost 14 percentages (around 28 billion of 
EUR) were destined to such investments (Robins et al., 2009). But we must add that different member 
states represent different attitude in this field. 
The average 14 percentages comes from contributions like: the United Kingdom 7, France 8, 
Germany 19, Italy 1 and Spain 10 percentages (Robins et al., 2009). The new Central and 
Eastern European Member States differ also in their approach. In case of Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary we cannot see significant opening towards the support of 
renewable energy sources. Meanwhile the Czech Republic and Poland give at least chance to 
the economy stimulant power of renewables, and Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania have 
addressed supports to several energetic investments related to renewables since the economic 
turmoil (Fouquet, 2009). 
A possible “green get-out” is supported by an EU-level 2011 initiative about the introduction of a 
common energy tax system, which can help cleaner energy resources becoming cheaper than those 
charging the environment. The “budgetary green reform” would mean finding the balance between the 
decrease of income taxes and the increase of taxes assessed on energy resources and contaminants 
(Hayles and Normander, 2011).  
Previous decisions also meet this idea. The Commission has accepted an Italian initiative in 
2008 about a lower tax rate on bio-fuel compared to the 22 percentages rate on traditional fuels 
(N 529/08).  
The European Union and its member states see the solution not in introducing new taxes, but in the 
reconstruction of the tax system, in order to serve those consumers that use environmentally more 
friendly energy resources (Lomas, 2011). It can be easily seen how the worsening financial and 
economic situation and the commitment towards green energy strain each other. We will see the 
stronger force from the level of emphasis of environmental aspects among answers in crisis 
management, and from how these measures will be carry out.13 
4.2. Changes in the regulation 
4.2.1 The effects of crisis on Community energy market liberalization process 
During crisis usually national challenges and urgent economic problems are solved contrary to the 
previously accepted common international interest, risking also further opening for instance. In 
energetics the situation is not that sharp. 
European energy markets were hit by the crisis in a period when the liberalization process started in 
1996 had not yet been closed. The third package of energy liberalization was accepted by the 
Commission after a long period of negotiations in 2009, so during the economic turmoil. The Directive 
                                                     
13
 According to a January 2010 report of Energiacentrum, the green investments have increased by 5-10 
percentages compared to previous year. Its reason may be that investors are disappointed in other fields of the 
economy and seeing perspective in this field they open toward renewables. 
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contains three important changes: the improvement of the access conditions to gas and trans-border 
electricity transmission systems and the establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER). 
However this regulation did not also force giant energy market players to make real ownership 
unbundling – which was the original Commission recommendation – but they could keep their 
previous networks with the creation of an independent supervision. It is not easy to decide whether 
this outcome results directly from the crisis or this way of regulation would have happened also if the 
economic turmoil had not taken place. Anyway during the 2009 negotiations we could already hear 
voices/opinions about the need for a new, fourth package to assure further development (Johnstone, 
2009; Simon, 2010).  
The deadline of making essential steps involved in the third package expired in spring 2011, but none 
of the member states has signed to fulfil their duties in the beginning of the same year. On the contrary, 
at that time more than 60 infringement proceedings were under way on the second internal energy 
package alone (European Commission, 2011b). 
The preparation of new liberalization provisions were followed by the Climate/energy package 
adopted in December 2008. It became part of acquis communautaire only in 2010 as part of Europe’s 
transformation, an answer to the crisis by the EU 2020 Strategy. The relationship between climate 
change and energy is a key element of the strategy, where the detailed “20/20/20” goal became drafted. 
Its meaning/aim is to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels or by 
30%, if the conditions are right; increase the share of renewable energy sources in our final energy 
consumption to 20%; and a 20% increase in energy efficiency” (European Commission, 2010c, p. 11). 
In 2011 the European Union could reach only one important achievement, which was the draft 
directive about energy efficiency (Tindale, 2011). One of its ideas is that recovery from the crisis 
would be easier and it would help the environment if Europe is able to utilize available energy. 
Unfortunately the adoption of the document seems to be difficult because of substantial member-state 
opposition to this Commission proposal – some on grounds of subsidiarity, and some on grounds of 
cost. 
4.2.2 New system instead of regulatory patchworking? 
It looks like energy sectors are being emphasized Europe-wide because of the crisis and thanks to the 
leadership of the EU not only the previously mentioned member states dedicate further importance to 
green energy. From financial market experiences we can say that the perfection of energy regulation 
would be crucial. Getaway financial market investors see perspective in energy projects if an effective 
framework gives assurance to them. 
The complexity and success of energy market regulation is highly determined by political and 
institutional circumstances and by current regulation-economic aspects. Three levels of energetic 
regulation can be observed on European markets in the last 20 years: recognition of the importance of 
supranational interventions, then creation of necessary institutions and finally the adaptation to the 
requirements of the growing European Union (Vasconcelos, 2009). Present economic crisis 
strengthens the necessity of supranational regulation in this field also. And if we take into 
consideration the central elements of the new Climate/energy package – energy efficiency, efforts to 
create a clean energy portfolio or interconnection of different energy systems – reconsidering original 
energy market measures seems to be of highest importance. The period of changes would be a perfect 
background to take this step. Both the European Union and member states can make the first steps in 
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the adaptation of energy market regulation to post-crisis situation. Without effective European energy 
market regulation the supervision can become stronger also on national level, which leads to the 
creation of regional energy markets. This outcome is also supported by the EU. 
5. Summary 
Crisis has also left its signs on crisis-proof energy sectors. Energy demand decreased, although thanks 
to its inflexibility in lower amount compared to other sectors. The fall of investments caused by the 
decrease of prices and demand and the general uncertainties were somehow balanced by surplus of 
money and political and economic interests coming from other sectors.  
Primarily/Mainly national level supports treated the energetic effects of economic crisis. However 
competition regulation slacked less in connection with this sector and supports serve rather 
development than company-saving. Other measures of crisis management – like extra taxes, 
privatization and the extent of state ownership – can be observed here, but mainly in the sense to 
obtain and assure short or long term income from the sector. Energetics became not only the subject 
but the measure of crisis management. 
Beyond the continuation of liberalization process the European Union is committed to the fight against 
climate change and to energy efficiency. So even if it seems that during economic and now euro-crisis 
non-financial sectors get into the upstage, it looks like energetics are getting more attention. The sector 
may obtain gains from crisis if approved state aids and energy projects with Community financial 
assistance are realized.  
Future of the European energy market is determined by today’s crisis management measures. The 
period that holds the possibility of changes gives good circumstances to the regulative restructure, the 
strengthening of international coordination even if the lack of financial and natural resources restricts 
the attainment of commonly accepted goals. Next few years will show how Europe can exploit the 
possibilities coming from energetics and regulation economic adaptation. The significance of 
regulation and tax-system changes made in the name of “green get-out”, supports from the 
Community and their execution could be much bigger as it is seen from today’s short term interests. 
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